1- APPLICATION FOR FEES AND COSTS - Wade & De Young, attorneys for the debtor, applied for fees and costs of $39,797.16 and the court allows $28,138.66. The application requests:

Attorney Fees	$26,467.00	212.9 Hours
Paralegal Fees	$7,941.50	148.6 Hours
Costs	$5,388.66	N/A
TOTAL	$39,797.16	361.5 Hours

    2 ABR 69 

James Thurman, d/b/a Earth Movers of Fairbanks, a major unsecured creditor with a claim of over $100,000.00, filed an objection to the Wade & De Young application on various grounds. The principal grounds are that: (a) the charges are lumped so that it is difficult to tell how much specific time is addressed for each task, (b) some of the charges for paralegal costs should be subsumed and the attorneys' hourly rate is overhead, and (c) the costs of travel are excessive. There is some merit to the Earth Mover's objection.

         The court held a hearing in Fairbanks on August 19, 1991, to offer the parties opportunity to present argument and testimony if they desired. Neither party presented testimony, but they did argue their positions.

         Wade & De Young's application itself, as opposed to the exhibits, does not describe what Wade & De Young did to any great degree. It has attached four exhibits. Exhibit "A" is a summary of the attorney fees charged for each statement date between 02/20/85 through 06/20/90 showing the number of hours for each attorney for each monthly statement. Exhibit "B" is a similar breakdown for the paralegals, and Exhibit "C" is a breakdown of the costs. Exhibit "D" is a 119 page compilation of the statements themselves. Some of them are very difficult to read due to the poor quality of the copies. I have reviewed the six volumes in this case and conclude that the amount sought by Wade & De Young should be reduced.

    2 ABR 70 

         2. ATTORNEY FEES- The application did not meaningfully categorize the tasks performed. It is difficult for the court to analyze 119 pages of statements to make sense out of them. A proper fee application for a case this size should present in a way easy for the court to follow the time records for each major task. For example, the records in connection with a major adversary proceeding, plan formulation, confirmation, relief from stay defense, et cetera. See Unsecured Creditors' Committee and Leon Uziel v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 924 F.2d 955, 960-61 (9th Cir. 1991). This can easily be done by setting up the computer billing for a major chapter 11 case with appropriate subcategories so that the bill can be produced by categories.

         The Uziel case held that the lodestar method was the primary method used in analyzing fee applications, but not mandatory. The lodestar method was described in Manoa Finance Company, Inc., 852 F.2d 687, 690 (9th Cir. 1988), but a bankruptcy court may use an alternative method where it is rational. See Uziel at 959-961.

         After reviewing the docket sheet in this case and the six volumes in the main case, I see that the court confirmed the chapter 11 plan. It was a liquidation plan. A small amount of money to fund the plan came from the sale of a loader and real property and a tax refund, but the largest amount available came from contract litigation against the Alaska State Housing Authority (ASHA).

    2 ABR 71 

         Wade & De Young handled the ASHA construction case for the debtor on a separate contingency fee agreement. Earlier this year, the ASHA case settled for over $1 million, but Wade & De Young became involved in a fee dispute with its client, the debtor. Wade & De Young was asking for a contingent fee from the ASHA suit for approximately $545,000, and the debtor wanted to pay about $450,000. The matter was submitted to a fee arbitration panel of the Alaska Bar Association, and I was advised at the hearing on August 19, 1991, that the panel had awarded something less than $500,000. This award was certified by a superior court judge, and the matter may now be on appeal to the Alaska Supreme Court.

         After reviewing the six volumes of the bankruptcy case file and with knowledge of the ASHA litigation, the court finds that the bankruptcy case seems to consist mainly of the initial filing, applications to sell some equipment and some real property, and the preparation of a liquidation plan which was to pay the relatively nominal proceeds from the sale of the property, plus a $35,000 tax refund, and promised to pay some portion of the recovery from ASHA. This is a "liquidation plan".

         Rather than reconstruct the amount of time actually claimed for each major task, the court will determine what it believes is appropriate in the context of this case for attorney fees. Therefore, the court awards for attorney fees at a blended rate of $150 per hour:

    2 ABR 72 

ATTORNEY'S TASKS	AMOUNT	HOURS
Initial consultation; prepare schedules	$4,500	30
Sale of loader	$1,500	10
Sale of real property	$750	5
Prepare plan and disclosure statement	$6,000	40
Miscellaneous	$6,000	40
TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES	$18,750	125

         I do not have a crystal ball. Wade & De Young may have actually spent all the time listed on its time sheets, but it is admittedly a difficult task to segregate the aspect of their representation that dealt with the ASHA construction claim, the Thurman litigation, and the bankruptcy. From a bankruptcy standpoint, Wade & De Young filed a simple liquidation plan, and have conducted essentially a holding action pending the successful conclusion of the ASHA suit. The fees I have allowed are generous on the side of allowing an award for the product produced.

         3. PARALEGAL FEES- Wade & De Young has argued that it uses paralegals extensively for a cost benefit to clients. This court encourages the use of paralegals and professionals who are capable of doing the work at the lowest hourly charge. Awarding fees for paralegals is allowable in this court. The Supreme Court has recognized such paralegal fee allowances in an appropriate case where it is the custom of the community to bill separately for the charges. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284-289, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 2469-2472 (1989).

    2 ABR 73 

         The problem with the Wade & De Young paralegal application, Exhibit "B" and Exhibit "D", is that much of what is charged for paralegal work is what would normally be considered as secretarial work which is absorbed by the relatively high hourly rate that attorneys charge. In re Four Star Terminals, Inc., 42 B.R. 419, 426 n1 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1984). See Shaperio and Wilkins, "Selected Issues Regarding Professional Fees and Expenses in Bankruptcy Cases," 1991 Ann. Surv. of Bankr. L. 146, 156-159 for a survey of case law which overwhelmingly supports the view that secretarial time is not a separate compensable item.

         If it is going to be a compensable item, this must be reflected by a comparable decrease in the hourly rate for attorney fees which many laymen find to be exorbitant. Missouri v. Jenkins at 2470 noted that secretarial costs should be recoverable. They are recoverable in the case at bar by virtue of the $150 per hour billing rate of the attorney.

         A random example of some of the charges that should be treated as "secretarial" is the entry for LSH (Lynne Hagen), a paralegal, on 07/18/85 for 1.3 hours for drafting and finalizing a notice of a proposed sale of property, instructions to another party (not a paralegal) regarding copying, preparation of documents for court. Also, a good portion of the 02/18/86 charges for LSH appear to be secretarial time which should be absorbed in the attorneys' hourly rate.

    2 ABR 74 

         I recognize that the billing does reflect the appropriate use of paralegals in many of the instances. By random sampling, the court concludes that about half of the fees should be deemed to be secretarial work, and therefore, will allow $4,000 of the $7,941.50 claimed.

         4. COSTS- Earth Movers has complained that some of the costs for airfare and overnight expense for the Anchorage attorneys to handle this Fairbanks case should be denied. The basis for this is In re Four Star Terminals, Inc., 42 B.R. 419, 437-438 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1984) which indicates that travel charges should be denied unless the attorneys can show that local counsel could not be appropriately used. See also LBR 23(a). The court encourages attorneys to participate telephonically in motion practice to avoid the cost of travel.

         In fairness to Wade & De Young, the telephonic equipment in Fairbanks was not up to snuff until approximately two years ago, and an attorney took a risk of not being able to hear the court or being understood if the attorney chose to attend telephonically from Anchorage at a Fairbanks hearing.

         Given the fact that the court has made substantial cuts in the attorney fees and paralegal fees, the court will simply allow the costs as claimed, having no doubt that these are accurate figures expended by Wade & De Young. Therefore the costs of $5,388.66 are allowed.

    2 ABR 75 

         5. CONCLUSION- Wade & De Young are therefore awarded the following:

Attorney fees	$18,750.00
Paralegal fees	$4,000.00
Costs	$5,388.66
TOTAL ALLOWANCE	$28,138.66

A separate order will be entered awarding these costs and fees.

      DATED: August 28, 1991






                                           HERBERT A. ROSS
                                           Bankruptcy Judge

Serve:
Wade & De Young
Joseph Sheehan, Esq. for James Thurman
Jon DeVore, Regional Counsel for SBA
U.S. Trustee