I.    Introduction

        This dischargeability action arises out of a divorce. It was tried before this court on March 6, 1991. Although the complaint is framed in terms of an exception to discharge, the pertinent issue faced by the court involves an interpretation of plaintiff's Luba Yerrington's "equitable interest" in property awarded debtor/defendant Seth Yerrington. For the reasons set forth herein, I find for the defendant.

II. Factual Backqround

        Luba and Seth Yerrington were married in December, 1977. At the time they were married, Mr. Yerrington owned a parcel of unimproved real property in Homer, Alaska. During the course of         1 ABR 439  the Yerrington's 13 years of marriage, a home was built on the property which the parties resided in for the remainder of their marriage. Both parties contributed to the building and maintenance of the residence. However, title to the property remained solely in Mr. Yerrington. Mrs. Yerrington moved out of the Homer property in May, 1989, and the parties filed for divorce in 1990.

        On July 19, 1990, during trial in the divorce proceeding, the Homer property was discussed by the parties and the court [Transcript of Proceedings, July 19, 1990, Yerrington v. Yerrington, Civil No. 3AN-89-7266, Superior Court for 3rd Judicial District at Anchorage]. Mr. Yerrington agreed that his wife was entitled to some of the equity in the house that had developed over the course of the marriage. In its oral ruling regarding property division, the court awarded the Homer property to Mr. Yerrington. However, the court also found that this property was "marital property", and ordered the debtor to execute a note and deed of trust to secure the note in the amount of $27,500.00 for Mrs. Yerrington's interest in it. Debtor was also directed not to sell or encumber the property until the deed of trust was recorded.

        At the conclusion of the court's oral findings, counsel for Mrs. Yerrington expressed concern to the court that its order left a "window of opportunity" for debtor to discharge his obligation to Mrs. Yerrington for the Homer property by filing bankruptcy. Counsel noted that during the period of time between         1 ABR 440  when the decree would be signed and when the debtor executed the note and deed of trust, the debt would not be "secure". Counsel suggested that the court have debtor sign the deed of trust before the decree was signed, so that the wife would have an "equitable interest" in the property. Because of counsel's concerns, the state court granted Mrs. Yerrington an "equitable interest" in the property to secure the $27,500.00 debt. When counsel also suggested that Mr. Yerrington have only 10 days, rather than 30 days, from the entry of the decree to sign the note and deed of trust, Mr. Yerrington protested, stating that counsel was intimating that he didn't have "any integrity in this matter at all."

        At the conclusion of the hearing on July 19, 1990, the court directed Mrs. Yerrington's counsel to prepare the written findings and decree. Mr. Yerrington was advised that he would have 10 days to review the documents prepared by counsel before they were signed by the court, and that he would then have 10 days within which to sign the note and deed of trust to secure the $27,500.00 obligation to Mrs. Yerrington.

        Despite his protestations of integrity, Mr. Yerrington took full advantage of the "window of opportunity" feared by Mrs. Yerrington's counsel. He filed Chapter 7 on August 9, 1990. The state court did not enter written findings in the divorce proceeding until August 23, 1990. The note and deed of trust to Mrs. Yerrington were never executed.

        1 ABR 441 
        Mrs. Yerrington filed the instant adversary proceeding against debtor, contending that she was a secured creditor or co-owner of the Homer residence, and thus debtor's obligation to her could not be discharged in bankruptcy. Debtor contends, on the other hand, that his obligation to Mrs. Yerrington is dischargeable in bankruptcy because it is not alimony, support, or maintenance and therefore does not fall within the exception to discharge contained in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (5).

III.    Dischargeability

        Mrs. Yerrington's major contention in support of non-dischargeability of her claim is that she was granted an "equitable ownership interest" in the Homer property by the court prior to the time debtor filed bankruptcy. The state court's written findings, which were entered post-petition, do state that she holds such an interest in the property. The written findings also specify that her interest in the property will not terminate until debtor has paid Mrs. Yerrington, in full, for her interest. By contrast, in making its oral findings, the court used the term "equitable interest" to describe the wife's interest in the property, which interest was granted at the time of the trial. Also, unlike the written findings, the court was not specific as to when the wife's interest in the property would terminate. In this situation, however, the differences between the oral and written findings do         1 ABR 442  not alter the outcome, as it is clear that the Homer property was discussed solely in the context of property division.

        Counsel for debtor contends that the written findings, which were entered post-petition, are void because they were entered in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362. As a general rule, the Ninth Circuit has held that "judicial proceedings in violation of this automatic stay are void." In re Shamblin, 890 F.2d 123, 125 (9th Cir. 1989). However, this court's decision in this matter would be the same regardless of whether the state court's written findings violated the stay. The state court's oral findings were binding upon the parties when they were made in open court. Rule 58.1(a) (1), Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure.

        The debtor's obligation to Mrs. Yerrington, whether secured or not, was a property settlement obligation. No evidence has been submitted to indicate that Mrs. Yerrington was entitled to support or alimony through the property settlement. The situation presented here is governed by In re Pederson, 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989). There a wife was granted a judicial lien for her contributions to real property which had been awarded to the husband. The husband filed Chapter 7 and moved to avoid the wife's lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1). The court noted:

Congress carefully considered and addressed the question of how dispositions of property pursuant to marital dissolutions should be treated in bankruptcy proceedings and embodied its policy for protecting spouses in section         1 ABR 443  523(a)(5). This section provides that obligations to a spouse for alimony, maintenance or support are not dischargeable in bankruptcy so long as they are "actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (5) (B) (1982). Property settlements, on the other hand, are dischargeable in bankruptcy.

Id. at 784 (citations omitted). As in the Pederson case, the award to Mrs. Yerrington resulted from the state court's division of property in the divorce proceeding. She had a "judicial lien" within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) as her interest was a lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding. The purpose of her "equitable interest" was solely to secure payment of a $27,500.00 property settlement obligation. Accordingly, this court must conclude that debtor's $27,500.00 obligation to Mrs. Yerrington is a property settlement obligation which is dischargeable in bankruptcy. Her judicial lien is subject to invalidation under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) in an appropriate proceeding.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

        1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice;

        2. Plaintiff and defendant shall each bear their own costs and attorney's fees.

        Let Judgment be entered and docketed accordingly.

        1 ABR 444 

        Dated:    March 21, 1991.

DONALD MacDONALD IV
United States Bankruptcy Judge

Serve:	M. Gregory Oczkus, Esq.
	J. Mitchell Joyner, Esq.