Wayne and Carol Callan filed a motion pursuant to 11 USC § 505 for a determination that they are entitled to a post-confirmation federal tax refund. I conclude that I either do not have or should not exercise jurisdiction in this matter, and dismiss the proceeding.

     The Callans filed a chapter 11 petition on May 6, 1987. Their Fourth Amended Plan of Reorganization was confirmed on February 27, 1989 (Docket No. 181). The property of the estate revested in the Callans upon confirmation. 11 USC § 1141(b).

     A dispute has arisen between the Callans and the Internal Revenue Service concerning post-confirmation taxes. As a result, the Callans filed a Motion to Determine Right of Estate to a Tax Refund on January 6, 1992 (Docket No. 213). About one year before     2 ABR 356  this motion, the Callans "applied [to the IRS] for a claim for refund and request for abatement of taxes paid • • • for heating fuel oil" for the periods from January 1, 1990 to September 18, 1990 in an amount of $58,944.40. (See the Callans' Memorandum at page 1, Docket No. 214).

     Prior to 1990, the Callans had purchased heating fuel oil from a wholesale vendor in Valdez for resale to the final consumers. The Callans reimbursed their vendor for the amount of the federal fuel taxes that the vendor had paid, but did not pass this tax burden along to the ultimate consumer. Instead, the Callans would apply to the IRS for a refund under a federal policy that exempted heating fuel oil from the taxation.

     The IRS had honored this procedure before 1990, but stopped honoring it beginning in 1990 due to a change in the statutes for taxing Diesel Fuel Sales pursuant to P.L. 100-203, the Revenue Act of 1987 (though the IRS now says that it should have enforced the policy earlier). The IRS states that the change in the law restricts the right to request a refund to the end user, and a middleman like the Callans is no longer entitled to claim the refund. See IRS Memorandum at page 4 (Docket No. 30, filed January 30, 1992).

     The Callans argue that the inability to use the $58,944.40 from 1990 fuel taxes which they had expected as a refund has hindered them in making their final plan payment which was due on December 31, 1991. The tax refunds are not specifically mentioned in the plan as a source of funding the reorganization for indeed the problem had not even been foreseen by the Callans. The Callans'     2 ABR 357  motion was filed under 11 USC § 505(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). § 505 provides:

§ 505. Determination of tax liability

     (a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court may determine the amount or legality of any tax, any fine or penalty relating to a tax, or any addition to tax, whether or not previously assessed, whether or not paid, and whether or not contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction.

     (2) The court may not so determine-           

(A) the amount or legality of a tax, fine, penalty, or addition to tax if such amount or legality was contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction before the commencement of the case under this title [11 USC §§ 101 et seq.]; or

          (B) any right of the estate to a tax refund, before the earlier of-

               (i) 120 days after the trustee properly requests such refund from the governmental unit from which such refund is claimed; or

               (ii) a determination by such governmental unit of such request.

     (b) [Allowing a trustee to request an early determination of whether a return will be selected by the IRS for audit.]

     (c) Notwithstanding section 362 of this title [11 USC S 362], after determination by the court of a tax under this section, the governmental unit charged with responsibility for collection of such tax may assess such tax against the estate, the debtor, or a successor to the debtor, as the case may be, subject to any otherwise applicable law.

     The IRS defends both on the merits and on the grounds that the court does not have jurisdiction. The jurisdictional argument is based on the premise that the portion of § 505 dealing with refunds refers to a refund by a "trustee," a term which no longer applies to     2 ABR 358  the Callans. I do not reach the merits of the tax matter, but agree that sovereign immunity is not waived in this contested proceeding which involves post-confirmation taxes which are not specifically alluded to in the confirmed plan.

     The U.S. Supreme Court recently held that a waiver of federal sovereign immunity must be found in the statute itself. It is immaterial that there may be legislative history supporting a Congressional intent for the federal waiver of sovereign immunity which might explain an imprecise statute. United States v Nordic Village, _____ US _____, 1992 WL 30618 (02/25/92).

     Here, the taxes do not come from operations under the "estate" but with respect to activities of the post-confirmation or "reorganized debtors." The trustee or debtor-in-possession is not seeking the refund. The Callans are no longer chapter 11 debtors-in-possession, akin to trustees for many purposes. 11 USC § 1107. No waiver for a refund is granted in precise words for a reorganized debtor, and under Nordic Village, none can be presumed.

     In addition, when a debtor confirms a chapter 11 plan it should begin cutting the ties with the bankruptcy process at the same time. Pettibone Corp. v Easley, 935 F2d 120, 122 (7th Cir 1991) held:

Once the bankruptcy court confirms a plan of reorganization, the debtor may go about its business without further supervision or approval. The firm also is without the protection of the bankruptcy court. It may not come running to the bankruptcy judge every time something unpleasant happens. In re Xonics, Inc., 813 F.2d 127, 130-32 (7th Cir.1987); In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 794 F.2d 1182, 1186-87 (7th Cir.1986). See also Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir.1984); Goodman v. Phillip R. Curtis Enterprises, Inc., 809 F.2d 228, 232-33 (4th Cir.1987); National City Bank v. Coopers & Lybrand, 802 F.2d 990, 994     2 ABR 359  (8th Cir.1986); In re Gardner, 913 F.2d 1515, 1518-19 (10th Cir.1990). Formerly a ward of the court, the debtor is emancipated by the plan of reorganization. A firm that has emerged from bankruptcy is just like any other defendant in a tort case: it must protect its interests in the way provided by the applicable non-bankruptcy law, here by pleading the statute of limitations in the pending cases.

     The closest case I was able to find offering any support for the Callans' claim that this court has jurisdiction is In re Original Wild West Foods, Inc., 45 BR 202 (Bankr WDTex 1984) in which the court said that it could enter a post-confirmation order necessary to support consummation of a confirmed plan. In Original Wild West Foods, a bankruptcy court enjoined the collection of a 100% penalty against a principal corporate officer of a reorganized debtor. The corporate tax in that case was provided for in the confirmed plan, and the IRS was getting paid. This case has been criticized on the grounds that it violates the Anti-injunction statute, but if it is good law regarding how far a court's jurisdiction extends post-confirmation, it still is related to pre-confirmation taxes, unlike our case.

     The holding in Pettibone Corp. is adopted, and this contested matter will be dismissed.