Menu    2 ABR 58 
HERBERT A. ROSS
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
605 West 4th Avenue, Room 138, Anchorage, AK 99501-2296 (Phone 907/271-2655)


In re Case No. A-91-00357-DMD
In Chapter 13

JAMES LESTER,

Debtor(s)
   ADV. PROC. A-91-00357-001-DMD

   ORDER DENYING TEMPORARY
   RESTRAINING ORDER



JAMES LESTER,

Plaintiff(s)           

v.

GOLDOME REALTY CREDIT CORP.,

Defendants(s)     


      A hearing was held on July 30, 1991 on the debtor's motion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin Goldome Realty Credit Corp. from proceeding with a foreclosure.

      The debtor, James Lester, had previously stipulated to the lifting of the automatic stay if a cure payment were not made to Goldome in about 25 days. Lester later found out he could not make that payment within the 25 days and asked for a short extension, but Goldome refused. This adversary was filed to enjoin the foreclosure since, once a stay is lifted, it generally cannot TOP    2 ABR 59  be reimposed by motion. In re Marine Power & Equipment Company, Inc., 71 B.R. 925 (W.D. Wash. 1987).

      To obtain an injunction the moving party must show: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) no adequate remedy at law; (3) a balance of equities favoring relief; and, possibly, (4) public interest favoring relief. In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 70 B.R. 786, 793 (Bankr.N.D.Cal. 1987). Lester says the payments are now "current" and it would be more equitable to have his debtor-creditor relationship with Goldome resolved in the chapter 13 confirmation process. In another case, this argument would prevail. Not in this case.

      Mr. Lester was debtor in a previous chapter 13 case, Case No. A-88-00179-HAR. He confirmed a plan in that case. Goldome had contested that plan, but its deed of trust was bifurcated or stripped down under the theory of In re Hougland, 886 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1989). Shortly after confirmation, Goldome had to seek relief from stay because of delinquency, but Lester again convinced Goldome to let him catch up. Finally, Lester dismissed the chapter 13 case when he again got behind to Goldome.

      Lester filed the present chapter 13 on April 18, 1991. He was substantially delinquent with Goldome before this second chapter 13 filing, and has failed to keep current after the case was filed.

      Lester argues that missing the stipulated deadline to cure a post-petition default by a few days was a minor breach, and the harm to him of a foreclosure far outweighs any harm to Goldome. TOP    2 ABR 60  But, the debtor has a long history of sporadic payments since this matter was first in bankruptcy court and has been a continual headache to Goldome.

      Goldome also argues convincingly that the confirmation of debtor's plan is far from assured. It was Lester's burden to show that he was likely to succeed in confirming a plan in this case in order to get a TRO. See In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc. above. He has not met that burden.

      Finally, a stipulation made by parties voluntarily setting deadlines should not be so lightly turned aside. Cf. In re Lenox, 902 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1990).

      In most of the chapter 13 stripdown cases, the lender is unable to collect on its mortgage insurance since recovery is generally conditioned upon completion of a foreclosure. When there is a confirmed chapter 13 case in which the lender's secured claim is stripped down, that lender often losses the benefit of its mortgage insurance coverage. Thus, in the real world, Goldome has a real stake in proceeding with a foreclosure. See Polk, "The Chapter 13 Cramdown: New Nightmare for the Lender", 19 Real Estate L.J. 279 (1991)

      While mortgage insurance coverage is disregarded in determining the value of the lenders secured claim under § 506 of the Bankruptcy Code, see In re Lopez, 75 B.R. 961, 962 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1987), it is a factor that should be considered in weighing the equities in this case. This loss of insurance cover has resulted in almost every chapter 13 stripdown case in this TOP    2 ABR 61  district to be hotly contested on all fronts by lenders, and almost all have been appealed by lenders.

      It is enough that a lender must suffer the loss of the insurance coverage without having to also continually monitor a delinquent borrower. Therefore,

      IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order is DENIED.



DATED: July 30, 1991 
  
 ______________________________
 HERBERT A. ROSS
 U.S. Bankruptcy Judge


Serve: 
Chris Johansen, Esq., for plaintiff 
Richard Ullstrom, Esq., for defendant 
M. Gingras, Adv. Proc. Mgr.H3611