In re: Case No. F99-00122-DMD | ) | Chapter 7 |
) | ||
DAVID LEE TOWNSEND, | ) | |
) | ||
Debtor. | ) | |
) | ||
______________________________________________ | ) | |
DAVID LEE TOWNSEND, | ) | Bancap No. 99-4021 |
) | Adversary No. F99-00122-001-DMD | |
Plaintiff, | ) | |
) | ||
v. | ) | |
) | ||
EDUCATIONAL CREDIT MANAGE- | ) | |
MENT CORP. and THE EDUCA- | ) | |
TIONAL RESOURCES INSTITUTE, | ) | |
) | ||
Defendants. | ) | |
______________________________________________ | ) |
MEMORANDUM DECISION
This is an action by David Townsend to establish the dischargeability of student loans under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). It is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I). This court has jurisdiction in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and the district court's order of reference. I find the plaintiff's educational loans to be dischargeable in part.
Background
The parties have stipulated to the following statement of uncontested facts:
Townsend has worked in a variety of positions over his lifetime. He started with Ralph's supermarket in Los Angeles after high school as a receiving clerk for $7.51 an hour. After four years in that position, he moved to Alaska and worked part-time as a painter and janitor at the University of Alaska - Fairbanks (UAF) for over two years earning $9.81 an hour. While living in Arizona, Townsend worked as a lab technician earning $5.00 an hour. He obtained a teaching position with the lower Kuskokwim School District for $28,000.00 annually during the 1982-1983 school year. After returning to Fairbanks, Townsend worked as an administrator for UAF, earning $13,000.00 to $15,000.00 annually. He later worked part-time on a UAF labor crew through May of 1989, earning $8.51 an hour. During 1989 and 1990 Townsend served as co-ordinator of building services at UAF, earning $18,900.00 annually. Following a move to Illinois in 1990, he worked part-time as a research assistant for $9.00 an hour. Townsend returned to Alaska and worked part-time as a bus driver and snow remover for $7.51 at UAF. From 1994 through 1996, he worked part-time as a research assistant and intern in St. Louis and Los Angeles. Townsend worked as a fish processor in early 1997, followed by stints as a warehouse worker and laborer in California during 1997.
Townsend's current employment with the Alaska Gateway School
District began in September of 1997. His present contract calls for
payments of $3,939.33 on a
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twelve month basis, or $47,200.00 annually.
His permanent fund dividend (PFD) for 1999 was $1,770.00. His monthly
deductions include:
TRS Teacher | $ 340.75 | |
Safeco (Retirement) | 150.00 | |
Medicare | 57.12 | |
Federal Withholding | 572.53 | |
Negotiations fee | 2.08 | ($25.00 per year) |
NEA Dues | 79.50 | |
Net Income | $ 2,737.35 |
His current net income, including a monthly allowance for a PFD of $1,770.00, is $2,884.85.
Townsend's expenses currently total about $1,450.00 per month without a housing allowance. They include the following:
Phone | $ 50.00 |
Power | 50.00 |
Food | 300.00 |
Clothes | 50.00 |
Gas | 200.00 |
Car Payment | 300.00 |
Car Insurance | 75.00 |
Miscellaneous | 100.00 |
Car Maintenance | 25.00 |
Support of Mother | 83.00 |
Computer | 204.70 |
Total | $1,437.70 |
Allowing rent of $550.00 a month, his monthly expenses are about $1,987.70 a month.
Analysis
Educational loans are not dischargeable unless excepting such
debt from discharge would impose an "undue hardship on the debtor or
the debtor's dependents." (1) The
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student loan recipient has the burden of proof to show undue hardship.
(2) The Ninth Circuit and the District
of Alaska have adopted the three part test of Brunner v. New York
State Higher Educ. Services Corp. (3) to determine whether an undue
hardship exists. (4) Brunner requires the debtor to prove:
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a "minimal" standard of living for [himself] and [his] dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans. (5)
The first issue facing the court is whether the debtor can maintain a minimal standard of living and still repay the loans. To answer this question, the court must first examine the deductions taken from the debtor's income. Virtually all the deductions taken from his income are mandatory, except for the voluntary payments of $150.00 per month made by the debtor to Safeco for a retirement plan. Adding this sum to net income leaves the sum of $3,034.85 per month for expenses. Deducting $2,519.00 in student loan payments yields a balance of $515.85 available for living expenses. $515.85 is inadequate for the cost of an apartment, without even considering the costs of food, clothing, shelter, transportation and utility costs. The debtor cannot maintain a minimal standard of living and repay the loans in full.
The second Brunner test is also satisfied here. The debtor's financial situation is likely to persist for the balance of the loan repayment period. Despite his academic achievements, teaching in Alaska has provided him with his highest salaries. His current salary has been frozen. Large salary increases are not anticipated due to declining enrollment and declining funding from the State of Alaska. If the debtor were to transfer to Anchorage his salary would decline to about $40,000.00 annually. His financial state of affairs will remain the same for the foreseeable future.
The final Brunner factor is good faith. The defendants concede this issue. I find that Townsend has acted in good faith in his attempts to repay his loans.
The focus of this case has been directed to the extent that the loans are dischargeable. The debtor and the defendants have supported recognition of the partial discharge theory in this case. I will adopt the rationale of Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Brown (In re Brown), (6) and Raimondo v. New York State Higher Educ. Services Corp. (In re Raimondo), (7) and reject the BAP's decision in United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Taylor (In re Taylor). (8) The debtor has the ability to repay a portion of his student loan debts, and is entitled to a partial discharge solely as to the portion he cannot repay. The parties differ widely on the amount to be discharged, however. Townsend offers to make payments of $800.00 a month plus 75% of his PFDs over a thirteen year period. His student loan creditors seek payments of $1,500.00 a month over twenty years.
The first issue for determination when considering partial
discharge of student loans is the amount of monthly debt service the
debtor could bear without
suffering undue hardship. As noted earlier,
Townsend's Safeco retirement payments of
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$150.00 monthly are
discretionary and unnecessary to maintain a minimal standard of
living. Thus, Townsend has $3,034.85 per month available for living
expenses and debt service. Of his expenses, only the sum of $204.70
per month for computer expense is objectionable. The balance of
$1,783.00 is reasonable and minimal under the circumstances. After
Townsend's computer is paid for in full, in March, 2001, his ability
to repay the student loans will increase commensurately. I find the
debtor has the ability to make monthly payments to his student loan
creditors totaling $1,047.00 per month beginning April 1, 2000, and
$1,252.00 per month beginning April, 2001. (9)
Having determined the amount of the monthly payment the
debtor can make, the next issue is the appropriate term for the
payments. Due to his prior service with the State of Alaska, Townsend
can retire in just 13 years at age 58. He seeks to terminate his
payments at that time. His student loan creditors demand that he
continue to work through age 65 before retirement. Assuming a blended
rate of 8.25%, payments of $1,047.00 per month for one year and
$1,252.00 per month for twelve years would amortize debt of
$126,250.00, or 52% of the debtor's student loans as of February,
1999. With the same assumptions and a nineteen year amortization of
the $1,252.00 payments, Townsend would amortize $155,925.00, or 64%
of the debtor's February 1999 student loan balance. I adopt an
intermediate position of 15 years based primarily on two
considerations. I recognize that the debtor is working in a very
stressful occupation with a high burn-out rate. The extreme
difficulties posed by teaching high-needs children suffering from
fetal alcohol syndrome have been well stated by the debtor.
Additionally, the debtor lives in a remote area with inclement weather
and few of the amenities that
people living outside of Alaska take for
granted. Given these factors, I feel a twenty year term is
unrealistic and not feasible. A fifteen year period is much more
appropriate, in
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my view, and will result in the amortization of
$136,470.00, or 56% of his total student loan debt as of February,
1999.
Since there is more than one student loan being considered under the partial discharge theory, all the student loan creditors should share equally in the payments the debtor will make. The debtor seeks to have one loan preferred, however. He had a co-signer, Ron Woolf, on a student loan with USA Group Loans in the principal amount of $6,757.00. The debtor's obligation to Mr. Woolf has been discharged in bankruptcy. The debtor seeks special status for this loan by allowing him to retain sufficient income to repay it in full. Alternatively, he asks the court to impose a requirement that loan payments to USA Group Loans (10) be applied first to the guaranteed obligation. I reject the debtor's position. Equality of distribution is a fundamental premise underlying the Bankruptcy Code. There is no legal basis for discriminating in favor of USA Group Loans and against the other student loan creditors to fulfill a discharged obligation to a co-signer or guarantor.
One obvious fly in the ointment remains. The State of
Alaska is not a party to these proceedings. (11) It can proceed
independently against the debtor and has the right to offset
Townsend's PFDs against its indebtedness. There are advantages to the
State if it consents to the current payment schedule, however, and I
am hopeful that it will
cooperate in the resolution of this matter.
It should receive more over time through pro-rata distributions than
simply through off-sets against PFDs. Assuming PFDs of $1,770.00, the
State would receive about $2,149.00 as a pro-rata share of payments
and
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PFDs the first year. As payments increase to $1,252.00 per month,
the State's share would increase to about $2,613.00 per year. Should
the State find such an arrangement unacceptable, any party may
petition the court for Rule 60(b) relief. (12)
Conclusion
David Townsend is entitled to partial discharge of his indebtedness under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). This is not an appealable order. It is simply a memorandum and not subject to appeal. Only the final judgment will be subject to appeal.
I request that the parties submit an agreed form of order and proposed judgment consistent with this memorandum. It is my hope that, through communication with the State, the parties can prepare an effective judgment that will end not only this controversy, but all further student loan litigation. The order and judgment should contain an appropriate mechanism for distribution of the debtor's monthly payments and PFDs. If the parties are unable to comply with this request, they should so advise the court on or before MARCH 31, 2000.
DATED: March 13, 2000.
1. | 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). |
2. | Alaska Comm'n on Post Secondary Educ. v. Jester (In re Jester), 1 A.B.R. 503, 505 ( D. Alaska 1991), citing Childs v. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (Matter of Childs), 89 B.R. 819 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988). |
3. | 831 F.2d 395 (2nd Cir. 1987). |
4. | United Student Aid Funds v. Pena (In re Pena), 155 F. 3d 1108, 1111-1112 (9th Cir. 1998); United Student Aid Funds v. Nascimento (In re Nascimento), 241 B.R. 440, 445 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); Jester, 1 A.B.R. 503. |
5. | Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. |
6. | 239 B.R. 204 (S.D. Cal. 1999). |
7. | 183 B.R. 677 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995). |
8. | 223 B.R. 747 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998). |
9. | These monthly payment figures include PFDs. |
10. | Presumably, TERI's share of the payments under the partial discharge theory. |
11. | Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Nutter v. Alaska Comm'n on Post-Secondary Educ. (In re Nutter), 5 A.B.R. 398 (D. Alaska 1998); Fowler v. Alaska Comm'n on Postsecondary Educ.(In re Fowler), 6 A.B.R. 94, 96 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1999). |
12. | Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). |